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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a secure and distributed
public key infrastructure for vehicular ad hoc networks VANETs
based on an hybrid trust model which is used to determine the
trust metric (Tm) of vehicles. The trust model consists on a
monitoring system processing on two aspects: the cooperation of
vehicles and the legitimacy of the broadcasted data. We propose
a fuzzy-based solution in order to decide about the honesty
of vehicles. Then, the vehicles which are trusted (Tm = 1)
and have at least one trusted neighbor can be candidate to
serve as certiﬁcation authorities CAs in their clusters. In order
to increase the stability of our distributed architecture, the
candidate CA which has the lowest relative mobility will be
elected as certiﬁcation authority CA.
We conducted a set of simulations in which we evaluate the
efﬁciency and the stability of the clustering algorithm as a
function of the speed, the average number of vehicles on the
platoon and the percentage of conﬁdent vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular networks are characterized by an open archi-
tecture that raises tremendous vulnerabilities [1] [2]. There-
fore providing information security is a serious challenge
in VANETs. In these networks, the signiﬁcant number of
vehicles and the high speed of vehicles bring out important
challenges and compel a strong and evolutionary structure for
securing communications. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a
good promising choice for enabling communications security
in vehicular environments. It is based on a trust third parte
called certiﬁcation authority (CA) which is responsible for
certifying the public keys of vehicles. However, in MANETs
and particularly VANETs, the conception of PKI must take
into account the disconnections in the network. Besides, the
CA must always be reachable by all vehicles.
In order to circumvent this shortfall, several research
works [5], [6], [7] proposed distributing the responsibility
of the CA among a set of nodes in the network. Almost
proposals use the mobility as metric to elect the vehicles that
will assume the role of CA. Unlike these works we propose in
this paper a distributed PKI where the CAs are dynamically
elected according to not only their mobility but also their trust
level since the CA provides a critical service that needs a high
level of trustworthiness. We extend our previous work [3] by
proposing a new trust model on which is built our architecture
of PKI. According to [4] trust management systems target the
information itself, they allow the detection of malicious data
and dishonest peers. Using our trust model we aim to evaluate
the trust level of the vehicles by inspecting the accuracy of
the exchanged information. Particularly, we use a fuzzy-based
technique in order to ﬁlter out fraudulent information and
malicious vehicles. The trust metric is updated according to
the instantaneous behavior of the vehicles. We consider two
aspects of the exhibited behavior: the cooperativeness and the
accuracy of the data that the vehicles exchange.
The paper proceeds as follow. In section 2 we discuss the
related work. In section 3 we detail our proposal, ﬁrst we
present the trust model, then we describe our distributed PKI.
Section 4 depicts the results of simulation. Finally, section 5
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present some existing works related to the
establishment of PKI in VANETs. Additionally, we describe
some existing trust models for vehicular networks.
A. Public Key Infrastructure in VANETs
Ramaraj et al. proposed in [5] a self organized key man-
agement system based on clusters. In their model, the network
is divided into a number of clusters based on the mobility.
They admit that in a cluster, vehicles have on average the
same velocity, a group can be represented by a single vehicle
deﬁned as the cluster head. In their self-organized PKI any
user can sign another user’s public key. The set of signatures
forms the network of trust relationships.
Raya et al. proposed in [6] a distributed PKI for VANET
managed by many CAs, each corresponding to a region. The
different CAs have to be cross-certiﬁed so that vehicles from
different regions can authenticate each others. This requires
that each vehicle stores the public keys of all CAs whose
certiﬁcates are needed to be veriﬁed.
In [7], authors use a PKI with virtual infrastructure where a
set of elected cluster heads are responsible for disseminating
messages after digitally signing them. This solution is intended
only for the attack called intelligent collisions. However, a PKI
in VANETs must cope with different attacks.
Unlike existing architectures and due to the important role
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of CAs, we admit that only trusted vehicles can assume the
responsibilities of CA additionally to the relative mobility
metric.
B. Trust Models in VANETs
In VANETs, there exist three types of trust models: 1)Entity
oriented, 2)Data oriented and 3)Hybrid models. The entity
oriented models require the evaluation of the legitimacy of
entities (nodes). In [10], the authors propose a trust model
where the vehicles are organized off-line into groups and each
group has a reputation value. The group reputation increases
if the average of its members’opinion about the road state is
conform to the real road state. The limit of this approach is
that the reputation of the group is correlated to the behavior
of all group members.
The data oriented models require the evaluation of the
legitimacy of the information received in the messages. The
authors in [11] propose a data-centric trust model. First, each
vehicle computes a report about an event by combining static
information such as the event type and dynamic information
such as the security state of the vehicle. Then all reports about
the same event are combined and their validity is inferred
by an inference module in order to calculate the posteriori
probability of the events. However, since the inference module
uses the prior probability, it is not easy to derive it due to the
high mobility in vehicular networks.
The hybrid models combine both entity and data oriented
approach. In [12], the authors proposed a hybrid approach
using a piggybacking technique. Once a vehicle receives a
message about an event it appends to the message a trustwor-
thiness opinion about the event before retransmitting it. This
opinion is computed combining metrics about direct experi-
ences, indirect trust relationship and opinions of other vehicles
received in the message. The drawback of this proposal is
that the ﬁrst opinion attached to the message will affect other
opinions since its computing is recursive.
III. THE PROPOSED TRUST MODEL
In the proposed architecture, vehicles playing the role of
CA are important because they are responsible for certifying
vehicles attached to their clusters. To this end, we need trusted
parts for issuing certiﬁcates.
We propose in this section an hybrid trust model for evaluat-
ing the behavior of vehicles and estimating their corresponding
trust metric (Tm). The idea consists on the monitoring and
the assessment of the behavior of vehicles in two aspects:
their cooperativeness in the network and the legitimacy of the
information that they broadcast. Each vehicle must monitor all
its 1-hop neighbors and calculate their Tm.
In the network, the vehicles broadcast messages related to
urgent events occurred on the road which are called warning
messages. Each time a monitor vehicle receives a warning
message, it evaluates the cooperation rate of the source.
After, it computes the reputation of the event reported in the
received message. Then, using a fuzzy-based approach the
monitor ﬁlters out malicious vehicles. Finally, according to the
outcome of the monitoring process, it updates the Tm of the
source. The Tm(i) is a continuous value in [0,1]. The vehicle
is trusted (conﬁdent) if its Tm reaches 1. In our proposed
PKI, only trusted vehicles are allowed to candidate to be CA.
Hereafter, we present the different steps followed by a monitor
in order to calculate the Tm of its neighbors.
A. Gathering information:
Along its trip, each vehicle broadcasts warning messages
that report events happened on the road. In all warning
messages, an information about the legitimacy of the event
is attached to the messages that we call reputation (RepV (E):
the reputation of event E computed in vehicle V). In fact,
around event E(x,y,t) occurring in position (x,y) and at time
t, we consider a static geographic zone Z where vehicles are
able to directly detect the event using their on board sensors.
The vehicle source of the message affects the reputation value
of event E as follow. If vehicle V is in Z and it detects the
event, then RepV (E) = 1, else if vehicle V is in Z and it
does not detect E but it receives a warning message about
E. Then, it denies event E then RepV (E) = 0. Otherwise
vehicle V calculates an aggregated reputation as described in
the following step.
B. Evaluating information:
If vehicle V is beyond Z or it has not an exact information
about the reputation of E, it computes RepV (E) by aggre-
gating all information about E, which are received from other
vehicles in warning messages as follow:
RepV (E) =
∑i=|S|
i=1 Repi(E) ∗ di ∗ Tm(i)
∑i=|S|
i=1 di ∗ Tm(i)
(1)
Where S is the set of vehicles from which V receives warning
messages about E, Tm(i) is the local trust metric of the vehicle
i computed by vehicle V, its default value is Tm(i) = 0.1
and di is the distance between vehicle i and event E. We use
the distance between the vehicle and the event because the
closer the reporter is to the event location the more accurate
its information on the event will be.
C. Evaluating vehicle behavior
The behavior is evaluated by the monitor, based on the
cooperativeness of the monitored vehicle and the legitimacy
of the information that it broadcasts, as follow:
- The cooperativeness: a monitor calculates a forwarding
rate called F . It is expressed as the number of messages
forwarded by a monitored vehicle divided by the total
number of messages transmitted by the monitor vehi-
cle [13]:
F =
the number of forwarded messages
the total number of transmitted messages
(2)
- The legitimacy of the information: Monitor V decides
the honesty of monitored vehicle i based on Repi(E).
We use the fuzzy set theory [9] to classify honesty of
vehicles. Each vehicle is classiﬁed within one of the
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We deﬁne 3 honesty levels represented by fuzzy sets as
depicted in ﬁgure 1. Then Ai is projected into one of
Fig. 1. Membership functions
the trust levels: (1) malicious (2) +/-malicious or (3) not
malicious. As expected in ﬁgure 1, each fuzzy set Fk
has a membership function ϕk : Fk → [0, 1] determining
which honesty level each vehicle is belonging to. Hence,
the probability that vehicle V is in honesty level 3 (not
malicious) is computed as follows [8] :
Pm =
ϕ3
ϕ1 + ϕ2 + ϕ3
(4)
D. Updating Tm(i):
Initially the monitor affects Tm(i) = T0 (0 < T0 < 1) to
monitored vehicle i . Then, according to the outcome of the
evaluation of the behavior that monitored vehicle i exhibits, the
monitor update Tm(i). If Pm is less than threshold δ2, vehicle
i will have Tm(i) = 0, and it is declared malicious. Otherwise,
if the value of (F ∗Pm) is greater than threshold δ1 then Tm(i)
increases by γ (1 mod γ= 0), otherwise it decreases by γ. If
Tm(i) = 1, vehicle i is trusted. It is worth mentioning that the
values of δ1, δ2 and γ are deﬁned as a function of the level
of accuracy that we aim to perform towards the evaluation of
Tm(i). The detailed algorithm for updating Tm is presented
in ﬁgure 2.
Fig. 2. The State-Transition Diagram of the Trust Model
IV. A DISTRIBUTED PKI FOR VANETS
This section details the clustering phase for electing vehicles
which will assume the role of CAs in their clusters.
A. Preliminaries
The basic idea of the proposed architecture consists in
establishing a dynamic and distributed public key infrastruc-
ture where the role of the CA is distributed among a set of
vehicles elected according to a clustering process. The elected
clusters heads (CHs) will be the CA in their clusters. A CH
is elected according to its trust level Tm, the number of its
trusted neighbors and the average of its mobility relatively to
its neighbors.
B. Clustering Algorithm
In our clustering algorithm, only trusted vehicles (Tm = 1)
can be candidate CA. Each vehicle in the network periodically
broadcasts a Hello message. It contains information about its
current speed, its current position, and Tm of all its neighbors.
The Hello messages are broadcasted up to d hops. They are
used to build and update the table of neighbors in each vehicle.
Particularly, they are used to calculate the average value of Tm
for each neighbor. Indeed, upon the receipt of Hello messages,








Where: N is the set of Hello messages which contain an
information about Tm(i).
Initially, when a vehicle enters in the network it waits during
a period of time timer1 for a Hello from an already existing
CA or an election beacon from a vehicle candidate CA, so
that it replies by a Join message in order to request for the
membership in that cluster. Otherwise, at the expiration of the
waiting time, if the vehicle is trusted and if it has at least
one trusted neighbor, it can candidate to serve as CA. Indeed,
it broadcasts a message called election beacon containing its
unique identity, the number of its trusted neighbors, its average
relative mobility. The election beacon is forwarded up to d+1
hops where, d is the maximal size of the clusters dealing with
the number of hops between the CH and the farthest vehicle
in the same cluster.
Upon the receipt of an election beacon a vehicle requests for
the membership to the CA originating such election beacon. In
case where a vehicle receives more than one election beacon,
its sorts the list of candidates CA according to their relative
mobility and the number of their trusted neighbors, in this
case the membership request is sent to the header of the list.
If the CA accepts the request then it replies with an accept
message, otherwise it responds with a reject message. During
the clustering process a vehicle passes through a set of states
before being attached to a cluster:
- INIT NODE: a vehicle just entering the road,
- CA CANDIDATE: a vehicle candidate to be a CA,
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Fig. 3. The state-transition diagram of the clustering algorithm
- ORPHAN NODE: an orphan vehicle which has no
neighbors,
- SEARCH NODE: a vehicle looking for a CA,
- ACCEPTED NODE: a vehicle accepted in a cluster.
The clustering algorithm is detailed in the state-transition
diagram of ﬁgure 3 and the transitions Ei are described in





E2 The vehicle is conﬁdent.
E3 The vehicle has at least one conﬁdent neighbor.
E4 No HELLO is received.
E5 A HELLO from a conﬁdent vehicle is received.
E6 A Join message is received.
E7 timer2 expires.
E8 No Join message is received.
E9 At least a CA candidate exists in neighbors’table.
E10 timer3 expires.
E11 No Accept message is received OR
a Reject message is received
E12 An Accept message is received.
E13 A HELLO from a CA vehicle is received.
E14 No RA vehicle still in the cluster.
vehicle, it decides the role of that vehicle in its cluster. In fact,
we deﬁne 3 types of membership in a cluster:
- RA: Registration Authority. Each trusted vehicle located
at 1-hop from the CA acquires the role of RA. The
set of RA vehicles constitutes the vehicular dynamic
demilitarized zone VDDZ. The role of the VDDZ is to
protect the CA from unkown and malicious vehicles.
- GW: GateWay. All vehicles members of at least 2 adja-
cent clusters acquire the GW state. A GW must have Tm
in [0.8,1].
- MN: Member Node. They are simple members of the
clusters.
Further details can be found in our previous work [3].
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we present the results of the simulation. We
pointed out the efﬁciency and the stability of our clustering
algorithm.
A. Simulation set up
We conducted a set of preliminary tests using the network
simulator OMNET++ [14]. Particularly we used the frame-
work inetmanet with the IEEE802.11 MAC layer. We consider
a segment of route with a length=10km. The vehicles enter
in the network with a rate λ in v/s (vehicles per second).
All vehicles have the transmission range equals to 450m. We
consider different arrival rate of vehicles as detailed in table II.
All clusters have the same maximum size ﬁxed to 300 vehicles.
In all simulations, the periodicity of Hello messages is 2s and
timeri = 5s, i=1,2,3.
TABLE II
THE ARRIVAL RATES
arrival rate (v/s) Average Speed
λ1 =0.5 10m/s
λ2 =1 20 m/s
λ3 =1.5 30 m/s
λ4 =2 40 m/s
B. Simulation Results
1) The average number of CAs and RAs: We investigate
the average number of CAs elected on the platoon and the
average number of RA vehicles per cluster. To this end, we
plot in ﬁgures 4a and 4b the average number of CAs on the
road and the average number of RAs per cluster as a function
of the average speed and the arrival rate of vehicles for 50%
and 100% of trusted vehicles.
At a speed of 10 m/s and λ4 = 2v/s, we have on average
2000 vehicles and the maximum range of a cluster is 3. Since
the maximum size of a cluster is ﬁxed to 300 vehicles, we
need a minimum of 7 cluster heads to cover the entire platoon.
With the same speed but for λ3 = 1.5v/s, we have instead
1750 vehicles and therefore 6 clusters are enough to cover
the entire platoon. For λ2 = 1v/s and λ1 = 0.5v/s, we have
respectively 1000 and 500 vehicles and therefore we require
exactly the minimum number of clusters which is 4. From 20
m/s to 40 m/s, the total number of vehicles is less than 1200 for
all assumed arrival rates and consequently, only the minimum
of 4 clusters is needed to cover the entire platoon. For both
cases (50% and 100% of conﬁdent vehicles), we found the
same result. Indeed, for 100% of conﬁdent vehicles we have
more conﬁdent vehicles which provides more RAs per cluster.
Let us investigate now the average number of RAs per
cluster. As depicted in ﬁgures 5a and 5b, we clearly observe
that the average number of RAs per cluster increases with
both the percentage of trusted vehicles and the vehicles arrival
rate but decreases when the average speed increases with both
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(a) The average number of CAs, 50% of conﬁdent vehicles (b) The average number of CAs, 100% of conﬁdent vehicles
Fig. 4. The average number of vehicles CA on the platoon
(a) The average number of RAs per cluster, 50% of conﬁdent
vehicles
(b) The average number of RAs per cluster, 100% of conﬁdent
vehicles
Fig. 5. The average number of vehicles RA per cluster
the percentage of conﬁdent vehicles and the vehicles arrival
rate. Indeed, a higher percentage of conﬁdent vehicles provides
more trusted neighbors to any cluster head and consequently
more RAs. This is a positive outcome since a high number of
RAs makes more secured the CA.
2) Impact of speed and arrival rate on the efﬁciency: Let
us study now the efﬁciency of the clustering algorithm. The
efﬁciency relies on the percentage of vehicles that acquire a
state in a cluster namely CA, RA, MN or GW. We plot in
ﬁgures 6a and 6b the efﬁciency as a function of the average
speed, the arrival rate of vehicles and two different assumed
percentages of conﬁdent vehicles. The efﬁciency stays above
97% for speeds below 20m/s but it lightly decreases for higher
speeds. We remark also that it increases as the arrival rate
increases. Indeed, for an arrival rate of λ4 = 2v/s or even
λ3 = 1.5 v/s the efﬁciency stays around 100%. For smaller
arrival rates and high speeds, the efﬁciency decreases. Still
yet, the efﬁciency is rather resilient to the decrease in the
percentage of trusted vehicles.
3) Impact of speed and arrival rate on the stability: We
investigate the stability of the clustering. Particularly, we are
interested in the average life time of CAs. Indeed, the longer
the elected CAs can maintain their status, the stronger is the
stability of the different memberships. We plot in ﬁgures 7a
and 7b the average life time of CAs.
As portrayed in 7b, the life time is about 100%, indepen-
dently of the speed and the arrival rates of vehicles. This
means that any elected CA stays so until it exits from the
assumed road segment. Figure 7a shows the same behavior
only when the vehicle arrival rate is high (λ3 and λ4). However
for smaller arrival rates, the average life time of CAs decreases
a little bit as the average speed increases. This small decrease
is mainly due to the small average number of RAs per cluster
at these points. However, the life time stays above 98% even
for a speed of 40 m/s. On the other hand and more interestingly
we notice that the percentage of trusted vehicles has a small
impact on the stability of the clustering scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a distributed and secure archi-
tecture for vehicular ad hoc networks. It is based on an hybrid
trust model aiming at evaluating the behavior of vehicles.
In our architecture, the responsibilities of CA in the PKI
is distributed among a set of vehicles. They are elected
according to a clustering algorithm based on two metrics.
Only trusted vehicles which have at least one trusted neighbor
can candidate to be CA. Besides, in order to enhance the
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(a) The efﬁciency of the clustering algorithm, 50% of conﬁdent
vehicles
(b) The efﬁciency of the clustering algorithm, 100% of conﬁdent
vehicles
Fig. 6. The efﬁciency of the clustering algorithm
(a) The average life time of CA vehicles, 50% of conﬁdent vehicles (b) The average life time of CA vehicles, 100% of conﬁdent
vehicles
Fig. 7. The average life time of the CAs
stability of the clustering, the candidate which has the lowest
relative mobility will be elected CA. The trustworthiness of
vehicles is evaluated throw a monitoring process based on
two aspects. First, a monitor evaluates the cooperativeness
of monitored vehicles and calculates their forwarding rate.
Second, the monitor assesses the legitimacy of information
broadcasted by their neighbors. Therefore, according to its
trust metric each vehicle acquires a role (i.e :CA, RA, GW
or MN) in its cluster. The simulation results out come the
efﬁciency and the stability of the clustering algorithm.
In our future work, we aim to evaluate the performance of our
trust model using the simulation.
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